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When the ancient Monarchy on the Danube was reshaped dualistic, the Mid- 
European Empire saw in it the solution of its longest lasting as well as its acutest 
problem, that had born a series of conflicts over the centuries.
With the agreement of 1867 the two traditional parts of the Habsburg Empire -  its 
leading Austro-Gcrman and Magyar layers -  entered what may well be called an 
alliance. At the same time Austria -i.e. the hereditary provinces together with the other 
domains and countries attached to them -a s  well as Hungary -  more exactly the lands 
of the Hungarian Crown i.e. Hungary with Transylvania, Croatia and Fiume -enjoyed 
sovereignity in their internal policy.
This, however, did not bring about by far the global solution of the nationality -  
problems of the multinational Empire, since the individual parts had their own serious 
internal problems on both national and nationality levels.
At this point, however, we must reject the concept, that considers duaiization of the 
multinationality Habsburg Monarchy that stood in the way of the two parts of the 
Empire to settle their internal nationality questions. This concept appeared in contem­
porary press as well as in later historical literature and keeps coming up even nowadays. 
Among the representatives of this concept are not only the spokesmen of the nations 
that remained in subjection, but also circles of the leading groups in cither part of the 
Empire who were reluctant to further the solution of the nationality questions.
While describing the nationality problem in Austria, even today we encounter 
constructions, which suggest that the solution of the nationality problem in Austria was 
hindered by the fact that the dualitstic transformation enforced by the Hungarians 
attacked the allimperial system which nevertheless could have provided better solu­
tions. This thesis is a hypothetical construction which cannot be justified by historical 
processes. Dualism by nature did not exclude the possibility of the development of a 
federation for any part of the Empire. Let us quote an Austrian bom American historian 
when he puts forward his critical views on such statements: ’The Compromise would
have left the way open for a federalization of the Austrian part of the monarchy 
according to the due constitutional process.”'
The approach, which can be found in the contemporary Hungarian publications as 
well as in recent ones, explaining the insolvability of the internal national questions of 
multinational Hungary by the dualistic system, and the fact that Hungary did not break 
away from the Habsburg Empire, cannot be justified. The far reaching sovereignity in 
internal questions -  the nationality question being one of these -  created circumstances 
which opened the way for better solutions as well, if that solution were seriously 
endorsed by a major force. Let us quote the conclusions of a Hungarian historian 
researcher of the age: ”It is theoretically possible to imagine a process, in which the 
Hungarian ruling class gradually gives up its hegemony, and recognizes the fact that there 
are other, separate nations as well existing within the country. But this was never accepted 
by the Hungarian ruling class. And it was not 1867 which hampered them in this.”'
The dualistic relationship -  like all other relationships -  meant both effects and 
counter- effects at the same time, but it did not prevent the coordinators of either of the 
leading nations of a part of the Empire from handling their nationality affairs on the 
grounds of equality.
If there were no satisfactory solutions in this field, then it is not due to the dualistic 
partnership, but to the contradictions of the internal structures, to the system of values 
and the policy expressing it, which was represented by the leading nationality in each 
of the two countries of the Empire, or speaking more exactly, by the top layers of these 
nationalities. It cannot, however, be denied that the forces interested in the maintenance 
of the Austro-German hegemony in Austria, and the maintenance of the Magyar 
hegemony in Hungary were inclined to exploit the dualistic system for their own 
interests.
The dualistic transformation -  as we have already mentioned -  was a novel way of 
solving one of the acutest national problems and the most difficult one of the internal 
tensions of the Habsburg Empire. This solution was also rooted in precedents in 
constitutional law.
The dichotomy of the state structure of the Habsburg Empire did not originate in 
1867, although its concrete form incarnated in constitutional dualism gave this 
dichotomy a new type of structure. But all these go back to centuries-old antecedents 
related to constitutional law: ”Das Problem des österreichisch-ungarischen Dualismus 
geschichtlich tief begründet... werden kann.”1 *3
The Ccntral-Europcan great Habsburg Empire took shape at the beginning of the 
16th century when the Habsburgs who had owned the so-called hereditary provinces, 
acquired the Czech and Hungarian Crowns and with these the lands and provinces
1Hoblik , Ludovit (cd.): Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich 1867. Materialen der internationalen 
Konferenz in Bratislava 28. 8-1. 9. Bratislava. 1971. pp.34-35. (Robert Kann’s observation)
“Vita Magyarorszag kapitalizmuskori fcjlodésérôl (Értekczések a törteneti tudomânyok körebol 55) 
Budapest. 1971. p .133. Debate over the Development of Hungary in the Capitalist era (Thrcatises in the Field 
of Historical Sciences 55) (Domonkos Kosary’s observation)
3Mayer, Theodor (cd.): Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausigcich von 1867. Seine Grundlagen und Aus­
wirkungen. München. 1968. p.24. (Otto Brunner’s observation)
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belonging to these Crowns.4 But for a long time the common Sovereign held the legally 
separate provinces together only loosely, moreover a large part of the territories 
belonging to the Hungarian Crown were ruled by the Turks. After the defeat of the 
Czech attempts to achieve independence in the Battle of Fehérhegy (1620) -  marked 
by brutal retaliations -  the royal absolutism closely attached the lands of the Czech 
Crown to the hereditary provinces and handled them as a conquered country.5 Similar 
attempts were made with the Hungarian Crown provinces liberated freshly from 
Turkish rule at the end of the 17th and at the beginning of the 18th century, though with 
less success as it is shown by the risings led by Thököly and Râkôczi, and the 
Compromise of Szatmâr in the year 1711,6
The difference in the Hungarian version of the Sanctio Pragmatica bears out as well 
that the enforcement of the general recognition of the common Sovereign and a 
common security policy in the Empire in fact reinforced and codified the legality of 
the formerly separate nature of the lands of the Hungarian Crown within the whole of 
the Habsburg Monarchy.7
Marie Theresa’s reforms of the state law followed the same line: with her state- 
administration code of 1749, she incorporated the hereditary provinces and the provin­
ces of the Czech Crown into a unified state. The bureaucratic apparatus of these 
provinces was formulated at that time and the structure of the different offices followed 
the same pattern. The authorities and the jurisdictional organisations uniformly used 
the German language, and German became the language of the schools as well. ’’Die 
einzelnen deutschen Erbländer und die Länder der böhmischen Krone, die selbst nach 
der Schlacht am Weissen berge weiterhin staatsrechtlich nebeneinander bestanden 
hatten -  as Graz historian Berthold Sutter writes -  wurde zu einem neuen Einheitsstaat 
vereinigt der von Wien aus zentralistisch geleitet wurde und dem nunmehr die Länder 
der Stephanskrone als zweiter grosser Komplex gegenüberstanden.”* This dichotomy 
in state law was made even more emphatic by the creation of a customs barrier between 
the two complexes which was in existence until 1850.4
Hans Lentze former professor of law at the University of Vienna who died in the 
late 60’s characterized this historical process as a lasting structure in state law in his 
paper, which he read at the 100th anniversary of the Compromise: ’’Österreich (Zis- 
leithanien) wurde als Teilstaat der Habsburgmonarchie durch die Staatsreform der 
Kaiserin Maria Theresia geschaffen. Maria Theresia fügte die deutsch-österreichischen 
Erbländer und die Länder der böhmischen Krone zu einem eintheitlichen Staate 
zusammen. Dieser von Maria Theresia geschaffene österreichische Staat hat sich in
*Reidlich, Joseph: Das österreichische Staats- und Reichproblem. Vol. I . Leipzig, 1920. p. I.
SJ. May, Arthur: The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914. Cambridge, 1951. p. 16.
6For recent, profound Hungarian literature see Kalman Bende’s and Domonkos Kosäry’s wirtings. For 
Austrian historiography see Csäky, Moritz: Das Thököly-Bild in der österreichischen Historiographie. In: 
Österreichische Osthefte, 1981. 4th number.
'Most recently in this topic see Haselsteiner. Horst: Joseph II. und die Komitate Ungarns. Herrschrecht und
ständlischer Konstitutionalismus. Wien-Köln-Graz, 1983. pp.62-68.
sDic Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. vol.IIl. Die Volker des Reiches. Wien. 1980. p.154.
4Mayer, op.cit. p.24.
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seiner Grundstruktur bis zum Untergang der Monarchie im Jahre 1918 erhalten.”10 With 
the acquisition of Galicia through the division of Poland, and the acquisition of 
Bukovina in 1775 the ”cis-Leithanian” state organized by Maria Theresa became more 
heterogenenous. Joseph II tried to reorganize the whole conglomerate, including the 
lands of the Hungarian Crown as well, on centralistic grounds, but this undertaking -  
surviving only for less than a decade -  went bankrupt. His successors did not try their 
hands in similar experiments for quite a long time. The assumption of the Austrian 
"Imperial” title in 1804 did not change the fact either that the lands of the Hungarain 
Crown within the "Habsburg Monarchy” and not within the "Empire” fomed a distinct, 
constitutionally legal part." During the territorial rearrangement of Europe after the 
Napoleonic era, the Habsburg Monarchy increased in size by two Italian provinces 
(Lombardy and Venice) and Dalmatia. Its heterogeneity went on increasing, though in 
spite of this the Theresian reform did not lose importance, and the hereditary provinces 
and the lands of the Czech Crown connected in a close union of state law maintaining 
the provincial division proved a permanent legal structure.
This is how the division of the provinces into two distinct parts -  the hereditary 
provinces and the connected lands on the one hand and the lands of St. Stephen’s Crown 
on the other -  has a long tradition on in the multi-coloured conglomerate of the 
Habsburg Monrachy. This twofold division was clearly expressed by the 1848 revolu­
tion as well. In the Spring of 1848 the lands of the Hungarian Crown turned-as definite 
state union -  into a constitutional monarchy (the Acts of April 1848). The other 
provinces of the Empire at the same time -  with the exception of the Italian provinces 
-  made an attempt at the same as distinct state union (constitution plan of Kremsier).':
As the reactionary forces got control over the revolutions, there was another retaliatory 
attempt during 15 years at centralizing the whole Empire. The attempt was another failure. 
There was a way out in the 2nd half of the 60’s after the Habsburg Empire lost its Italian 
provinces. This way out was to recognize and stabilize to contemporary needs the 
historically developed duality of the state structure. As a French specialist of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, Victor Tapié well summarized: ’Thus the old dynastic union which had existed 
since 1526 and the unified Empire desired by Felix Schwarzenberg were replaced by a 
perpetual association between two modern states: Austria-Hungary had been bom.”1' The 
Compromise then, which put the age old dual structure of the Habsburg Monarchy on the 
grounds of constitutionalism and alliance did not create this dual structure. "Die besondere 
Stellung Ungarns im Rahmen der Gesamtmonarchie war ja schon seit 1526 eine historische 
Realität” -  writes Robert Капп.ы Hans Lentze, however, referring to the twofold way the 
inheritance law was enacted in Hungary, emphasizes: ’’The Sanctio Pragmatice formed 
a real legal basis of Dualism.”"
wHolotik, op.cit. p.925.
"Redlich, op.cit. p.42.
I2C. Hellhling, Ernst: Österreichische Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgcschichte. wien, 1956. pp.349-350. sec 
also Bernatzik. Edmund: Die österreichischen Vervassungsgcsetzc mit Erläuterungen. Wien. 1911. p. 115.
1 Tapie. Victor: The Risa and Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy. London, 1971. p.307. 
l4Dic Habsburgermonarchie, vol.3. op.cit. p. 1313.
"jogtôrténcti tanulmânyok (Papers in Legal History) vol.2. Budapest. 1968. p.74.
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T H E  N A T IO N A L IT Y  C O M P O S IT IO N  O F  H U N G A R Y
Hungary, in the system of Dualism, of a surface of 325.000 km2 and of a population 
of about 15 million at the beginning of the era and 21 million at the end was a 
multinational country.16 From the point of view of state law it consisted of 3 parts: 
Hungary united with Transylvania (87% of both surface and population), Croatia, 
having provincial self- government (13% of both surface und population) and Fiume 
and surroundings bearing the title of corpus separatum (a surface of 21 km2, and in 
1900 having about 39000 inhabitants). In official statistics and documents the three 
parts together were referred to as the ’’Hungarian Empire” to make it different from 
Hungary without Croatia. The nationality composition of the ’’Hungarian Empire” at 
the turning of the century -  when the population numbered a total of 19,254,559 -  can 
be listed as follows (rounded up, in thousands):17
Magyar 8,742 45,4%
Romanian 2799 14,5%
German 2135 11%
Slovak 2020 10,4%
Croatian 1682 8,7%
Serbian 1048 5,4%
Ruthenian 429 2,2%
Slovene (Vend) 99 0,5%
Other Slavic 203 1 %
Other 95 0,5%
Nationality composition of Hungary (together with Fiume) in 1900 (total population: 
16,838,255):
Magyar 8651 51,4%
Romanian 2798 16,6%
Slovak 2002 11,8%
German 1999 11,8%
Serbian 438 2,6%
Ruthenian 425 2,5%
Croatian 191 1,1%
Slovene (Vend) 79 0,4%
Other Slavic 170 1%
Other 83 0,5%
Official statistics count Fiume together with Hungary. It is worthwhile, however,
l6See among others data in A. Kann. Robert: Das Nationalitätenproblem der Habsburgermonarchie, vol.2. 
Graz-Kölz, 1964. Appendix pp.388-389.
l7Seedata in Magyar Statisztikai Kôzlemények. Ùj sorozat5. kotel. A magyar szent korona orszâgaiпак 1900. 
évi népszâmlâlâsa. III. rész. A népesség részlctes leirâsa. (Publications in Hungarian Statistics. New Series 
vol. 5 National Census of the Lands of the Hungarian Holy Crown in the Year of 1900. Part 3. A Detailed 
Description of the Population) Budapest, 1907. pp.204-213.
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taking a look at the nationality composition of Fiume and surroundings in 1900, having 
a population of 39,000:
Italian 17,352 44,5%
Croatian 7,492 19,2%
Dalmatian 12,628 32,3%
Illyrian 5,136 13,1%
Magyar 2,842 7,2%
Slovene 2,251 5,7%
German 1,945 4,9%
Czech 147 0,3%
Nationality composition of Croatia (2,416,304 inhabitants in 1900, rounden up in 
thousands):
Croatian 1,491 61,6%
Serbian 611 25,3%
German 136 5,6%
Magyar 91 3,7%
Czech 32 1,3%
Slovene 20 0,8%
Slovak 17 0,7%
(Nationalities numbering only small fractions and groupings of unidentifiable 
nationality are not shown in the above two charts.)
When analysing the composition of the nationalities of Hungary and Croatia, certain 
relationships are particularly worth noting: First of all, not only Hungary, but also 
Croatia was multinational. The largest element in the population of Croatia was 
Croatian, making up 61,6%. This is slightly higher than the largest element in Hungary’s 
population, which was Hungarian and made up 51,4%. It is worthwhile, however, to 
take these proportions into consideration together with the German nationality. In 
Croatia the Croatian and German nationalities represent 67,2%. In Hungary the Magyar 
and German nationalities together make 63,2%. There existed therefore a certain 
similarity between the structure of the nationality composition.
Another noteworthy instance is the distribution of the Serbian nationality between 
Hungary and Croatia. There were 610 908 Serbian inhabitants living in Croatia, in 
Hungary there were 437 737. While in Hungary this menât 2,6% of the population, in 
Croatia it was the strongest represented nationality with 25,3% of the population.
A further noteworthy factor is the fact that in both countries the leading element of 
the other country was only present in negligible numbers. There were 191 432 Croatian 
inhabitants living in Hungary -  almost wholly on the Trans-Danubian territory - , while 
in Croatia there were 90 781 Magyars. This nationality stratification also contributed 
-  obviously together with the historical antecedents -  to the fact that the Hungarian 
leading layers recognized the constitutionally legal nature of the distinct standing of 
Croatia.
In this context one question springs to mind: why did the Magyar leading elements
182________________________GALÂNTAI JÔZSEF___________________________
automatically exclude a similar solution in relation to Transylvania, given the fact that 
a certain degree of historical autonomy had developed there as well. In the part of the 
country which lies beyond the ”Kiraly”-Pass -  this corresponds to the former distinct 
Province of Transylvania — 2 476 998 people were living in 1900, and out of this 
814 994 were Magyars (33%), i.e. one third of the population. That is almost 10% of 
the Magyar nationality living in the Carpathian Basin. Only one half of the Romanian 
nationality living in the Carpahtian Basin -  1 397 282 people -  lived on the territory 
of historical Transylvania in 1900 making up 56% of the population of this part of the 
country. The maintenance of Translyvania’s autonomy in constitutional law would then 
have created basically different nationality conditions from what finally resulted from 
Coratia’s provincial autonomy. In case Transylvania had kept its status as a province, 
the third of its population would have been Magyar, i.e. in minority. As a result of the 
union, however, the Magyar population of Transylvania formed part of the nation in 
majority. So if Transylvania had become an autonomous unit in the Hungarian Empire 
similar to Croatia, 10% of the Magyar population living in the Carpathian Basin would 
have become a minority. The Croatian autonomy, however, only concerned 0,5% of 
the Magyar population of the Carpathian Basin. Another basic difference lies in the 
fact, that in Transylvania the Magyar owner class had economic and political leader­
ship, whereas in Croatia the leading role was in the hands of the Croatian owner class 
and middle class. Moreover in Transylvania cultural hierarchy did not follow the 
numerical hierarchy of the nationalities, as it did in Croatia. Recognizing the provincial 
autonomy of Croatia did not, therefore, present any difficulty, while the problem was 
obvious in the case of Transylvania.
If we consider the possiblitiy of the unrealized Transylvanian autonomy comparing 
it to the Croatian which did get realized, we need to see that the Croatian autonomy 
went evidently together with the Croatian leading role, not only with regard to 
numerical majority (62%), but also from the points of view of cultural and economic 
state of development of the Croatians within the province, not to say a word about 
historical traditions. This is how Croatian autonomy did not lead to the strengthening 
of the tensions among the nationalities inside the province, though it led to no solution, 
either. In Transylvania, however, the differences among the stages of cultural and 
economic development of the particular ethnic groups together with the historical 
traditions of leadership and the numerical majority of the Romanian ethnic element 
(56%) would have let to similar, if not even more acute internal tensions among the 
nationalities in the event of an autonomy, than those proper to Hungary after the union 
took place. In spite of this, the maintenance of the Transylvanian autonomy could 
probably have shown several positive features among the nationality conditions of the 
age of Dualism. It could have given a more important forum to Romanians living in 
the Carpathian Basin and might have helped the formation of a more permanent 
compromise of the nations living here.
It was characteristic of the nationality composition of Hungary and Croatia, that 
while some nationalities lived entirely within the borders of the state, some did only 
partially so. Magyars with few exceptions lived in Hungary, and so did the Slovaks. 
The overwhelming majority of the Croats lived in Croatia, part of them, though, lived
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on the territory of the Austrian State (Dalmatia and Istria) and within the Monarchy 
(Bosnia). Part of the Serbs -  as we have seen -  lived in Hungary and in Croatia, but 
most of them lived outside the Monarchy (in Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina). The 
greatest part of the Roumanians lived outside the Monarchy, but those living inside, 
were found overwhelmingly in Hungary (in Bukovina itself there were 250 000 
Roumanians). Ukrainians likewise, mostly lived outside the Monarchy, and those living 
inside, were found only in small numbers in Hungary. To sum up, in Hungary, just as 
in the ’’Hungarian Empire” 65% of the population belonged to a nationality whose 
major part or the whole of which lived either inside the country or inside the ’’Empire”.
Data concerning the distribution of the nationalities in Hungary come from the 
official statistics of the year 1900. This is just why it needs mentioning that during the 
half century of the dualistic era there was a certain shift taking place in Hungary -  
Croatia is not considered here -  in the nationality composition in favour of the Magyar 
ethnic element. According to statistics of 1880, the proportions of Magyars in Hungary 
was 46,7%, while it is 54,5% in 1910 statistics. This shift, though not without 
significance, did not bring about any change in the nationality composition of Hungary. 
This shift was motivated by several factors: the growth of the Magyar population was 
slightly higher than that of the nationalities, and emigration on the side of the 
nationalities was also more significant at the turning of the century. Another important 
factor is that during this half century there was a significant Magyarization amongst 
certain groups of the German and Slovak nationalities in Hungary as well as among 
the Israelite populations not yet of Hungarian mothertongue. The rise of the proportion, 
that is the shift, arose mainly from these factors. This, however leads to the question of 
the Magyar national feeling.
T H E  N A T IO N A L  F E E L IN G  O F  M A G Y A R  L IB E R A L IS M
The last decades of the 18th, and the first decades of the 19th century bring about the 
formation of the first stage of the Magyar national identity. The concept of ’’Hungarian 
nation” (’’Natio Hungarica”) was filled with new content, for which the basic idea was 
provided by the French Rationalism, or more exactly the Enlightenment. In this sphere of 
thoughts ’’state” and ’’nation” are overlapping concepts: the state encompasses the nation, 
and what the state, in turn encompasees, is the (French) nation. The Magyar national feeling, 
too. found expression in these concepts and relations at the beginning of the century: the 
Natio Hungarica is no more solely the nobility of the historical nation, but its whole 
population, regardless that it is not homogeneous in language, i.e. it is not exclusively 
Magyar. It seemed evident for the spokesmen of the Magyar national thinking that it is 
merely a question of will and labour to make the historical state -  filling out the whole of 
the Carpathian Basin, mainly through refining and spreading the Hungarian language, -  
appear as a Magyar nation in language and in culture.18 1
1 *S:ekfit. Gyula: Allant és nemzet. Tanulmânyok a nemzctiségi kérdésrol (State and Nation. Papers about the 
Nationality Problem) Budapest, 1942. pp. 112-113. see also Szekfii. Gyula: Iratok a magyar âllamnyelv 
kérdésének tôrténetéhez (Documents to the Question of the Hungarian State Language) Budapest. 1926. 
pp. 14- 18.
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It soon became apparent, however, that this process is not so very self-evident. The 
need and the ideology of a national development possessed the Hungarian nationalities 
too, first of all the intellectuals of these nations -  and they felt urged under partial 
influence of Herder to cultivate their mother-tongues and refine their nationalities. 
Filling out the frame of the historical Hungarian state in a ’’Magyar national” way on 
the one hand, and the need of the non-Magyar nations to develop their own national 
identity on the other became a source of conflicts.19
By the 40’s of the 19th century, when the concept of the Magyar liberalism took its 
final shape, this conflict became so acute that there was no way to step aside. Most of 
the Magyar liberals were inclined to solve the conflict by pushing through the original 
concept. Part of the liberals, however, greatly influenced by Széchenyi’s observations 
and warnings/" accepted the fact -  during the 40’s -  that the country is not only 
populated by Magyar native, and that -  nevertheless they hoped for the spreading of 
the Magyar language -  this state of affairs promises to be permanent. Therefore they 
thought that the liberalist principles would have to be applied in the language use and 
in the education of the population. At the same time they also sticked to a politically 
homogeneous state whose character should be Magyar.
The unity of the state and its Magyar character were referred to by the concept of 
the Magyar political nation . Spreading of non-Magyar tongues and cultures, 
however, were regarded as ’’nationality rights”. This is how ’’nation” and ’’nationality” 
were termes that theoretically belonged to different categories in the 40’s liberal 
Hungarian thinking and press. ’’Nation” was, in the closest way related to the political 
state organization, since the character of a state organization -  remaining faithful to the 
terminology of the French revolution -  comes from the nation. Since on the territory 
that belonged to the Hungarin Crown, there were two unities (state-unities) on the basis 
of constitutional law -  as it was interpreted in the Hungarian liberal thinking. These 
two were Magyar and Croatian, and these two nations were to be recognized as political 
nations. At the same time, inside the Magyar political nation the poliglottism of the 
population was a matter of course, that is, there were nationalities besides Magyar for 
which they were willing to ensure certain rights springing from liberal principles; not 
constitutional rights, not political-state rights, but those applying to language use and 
to cultural, religious needs.
It must be admitted that this concept that had formed by the 40's was a little step 
forward as compared to the beginning of the 19th century and to the majority of the 
liberals whose thinking got stuck at that point. Yet. this concept did not reflect the actual 
conditions. ’’Nationalities” recognized in their linguistic and cultural properties referred 
to themselves as ’’nations”, and, what is more, as political nations, just the same way 
as did Magyars und Croats, even if they wished to express their existence as a nation 
not through autonomous statehood, but through an autonomy that did not violate the 
unity of the state -  such as an autonomy on county-levels on the grounds of constitu­
e r a i « .  Endre: A magyarorszâgi nemzetiségck nemzeti ideolôgiâja (National Ideology of Hungarian 
Nationalities) Budapest, 1983. p.248. 
oee his work entitled Hunnia, his talk at the Academy, etc.
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tionai law. Since they claimed the same status for themselves as the Magyar nation for 
itself, they felt it a grievance that Magyar was made the ’’official” language of the state, 
because what they saw in it was that the character of the state was still set by one nation, 
in relation to which their own nationality became secondary. They found the Act II. of 
1844 therefore especially injurious, which prescribed the use of Magyar not only in 
state institutions and offices, but in schools as well (’’language of education”).'
Magyar nationalism was an important promotion for strivings after a bourgeois 
society and independence, though at the same time it had its shady sides already.
While the forces of Magyar liberalism stood outside the state power, these polemics 
and disharmonies did not lead to serious conflicts. During the years 1848 and 1849, 
however, when Magyar liberals already stood for their principles in national and 
nationality questions as factors of actual power, this conflict came to a crisis and ended 
in heavy consequences. Drawing conclusions became inevitable and part of the liberals 
did not want to step aside either. The change in their thinking was reflected especially 
by the nationality decree in 1849, but also by the acceptance of the principle in 1848 
of an autonomy -  perhaps of total independence -  that they were to give to the 
Croatians. The authors of the 1849 decree did not give up the thought of the one Magyar 
political nation as regards Transylvania united with Hungary (Croatia was not included 
here), but they ensured far-reaching nationality rights. This then was a solution based 
upon compromise, which could have been realized in practice if they act in time, as a 
temporary compromise between Magyar and non-Magyar nations. '
This was in practical terms the theoretical basis of the liberal policy after 1849 in 
Hungary and in exile.
The principle of the ’’one political nation” was given special emphasis in the national 
thinking of the Magyar liberalism. This meant that the historical Hungary (Croatia was 
not included) -  regardless that its inhabitants speak mostly languages other than Magyar 
-  makes up one political nation, it forms one state the character of which is Magyar. 
Within this basic concept incarnating unanimous belief, however, there were at least 
three main trends to recognize.
One held that the Magyar political state may, and must be made Magyar in language 
as well, and that this can be done through definite measures in relatively short time.
The other accepted the fact of the linguistic differences and took it for a lasting 
phenomenon, that cannot really be altered through governmental prescriptions. Those 
who were for this standpoint displayed far-reaching readiness to admit the diversity in 
the fields of language, culture and religion. At the same time they felt it essential to 
emphasize that the Magyar state forms ’’one political nation”, and it is of Magyar 
character, which the nationalities -  in return for the far-extending rights they enjoy -  
have to accept.
Representatives of the third trend did not only admit the fact that the
2'Corpus Juris Hungarici. 1844 2nd law. It gives an overview of the nationalities’ reaction in the struggle 
about the language-quesiton. Arato, op.cit. esp. chapters 4 and 5.
22For 1849 Nationalities Law see I.Toth. Zoltan: A Szcmere-kortruiny ncmzctiségi politikâja (Nationality 
Policy of the Szemere- government) This paper is part of /. Toth, Zoltan: Magyarok és românok. Torténelmi 
tanulmânyok (Magyars and Roumanians. Papers in History) Budapest, 1966. pp.360-370.
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nationalities’ needs concerning language, culture and religion have to be fulfilled and 
treated according to liberal principles, but recognized likewise that the concept of 
the one Magyar political nation is unacceptable for the nationalities. Though this 
trend did not give up the concept of the one Magyar political nation either, it did 
not push the nationalities to accept it even in theory, and was still looking for a 
compromise.
Each of these three trends are present along the history of Magyar liberalism from 
the beginning in 1865 of the Austrian-Hungarian negotiations all through the Com­
promise in 1867 up to the acceptance in 1868 of the Croatian autonomy and the 
nationalities law. The debate about the above three attitudes has an importnat say in 
shaping the standpoint voted in the 1868 laws. The first trend, whose main basis were 
the county landowner of the nationality territories got the upper hand, though it had 
many a spokesman at the diet as well. Deâk became the principal representative of the 
second attitude, while the most important propagator of the third was Eötvös. This is 
how on handl ing the nationality problems, the debates were not restricted to discussions 
between the spokesmen of the group of Magyar liberals and the representatives of the 
nationalities, but there was a struggle among the three main trends of Magyar liberals 
as well.
Leaders of Hungarain nationalities did not generally regard the concept of the 
dualistic transformation injurious by itself for they national rights. The reason why they 
fought was to gain a certain autonomy in the structure of the Magyar state. This was 
so, for the Hungarian nationalities -  despite Schmerling’s attempts to the contrary -  
were not granted real favours by Vienna even durign the the Provisorium-period. The 
Roumanian population in Transylvania was an exception to this, their leaders obtained 
considerable influence at the Transylvanian Diet. Since the dualistic transformation 
went together with a strengthening of the union one more time, that is, with the ceasing 
of the autonomy of Transylvania, they grieved over the dualistic reshaping itself, and 
boycotted the 1865-1868 diet. Romanian leaders in Hungary, however, who made up 
the other part of the Romanian population of the Carpathian Basin took an active part 
in the 1865 parliamentary elections, and in the subsequent parliamentary debates.
So, besides filling Austrian-Hungarian relationship with new content, a further 
question of central importance of the period was how the relation among the nations 
in the two separate parts of the freshly dualistic Empire was going to work out. For the 
perspective of the whole State system the two questions were of equal importance.
C R O A T IA N  A U T O N O M Y
In 1848-49 serious conflicts broke out between the Magyar and the Croatian national 
movements. During the period of Absolutism, however, the Croatians were unsatisfied 
with the policy of Vienna, and were inclined to reestablish the old State community 
with Hungary.23 This endeavour prevailed during the Schmerlingian centralistic system 2
2 'Miskolczy, Julius: Ungarn in der Habsburger Monarchie. (Wiener Historische Studien, Band V.) Wien- 
München, 1959. p. 145.
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as well. After the beginning of the dualistic bargaining in 1865, the Croatian leading 
layers started to view the negotiations of Vienna and Pest with growing distrust. They 
had to realize that with the dualistic transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy Croatia 
would get into a subordinate position to Hungary. The Croatians of course had no doubts 
as to the fact that historically Croatia belongs to the Monarcy by the right of the Crown 
of St. Stephen. Likewise, they admitted that this results in a closer relationship between 
Hungary and Croatia. But they denied that this should imply Hungary's hegemony. The 
Croatian leading layers conceived the relationship with Hungary practically in the form 
of a personal-union as far as constitutional law was concerned. The Croatian diet did 
not cut its connections with the Hungarian diet they started in 1861, they only sticked 
to the Hungarian diet recognizing -  before exact settling of Croatian-Hungarian state 
law relations -  Croatia’s unity and independence, its legal position equal to Hungary, 
and the principle of parity in the clearing up of the two countries’ relationship. The 
Hungarian diet were not willing to negotiate on such conditions.
The appointment of the Andrâssy-government with the subsequent coronation and 
the sanctifying of the Compromise Law strengthened Hungary’s position against 
Croatia. Delegations of the Hungarian and the Croatian diets started their talks at the 
end of April 1868 about Croatian autonomy.34
At length the agreement about Croatian autonomy was brought to existence by the 
delegates of the Hungarian and Croatian diets. It was enacted in the Hungarian code as 
law 1868:XXX. and as law 1868:1 in the Croatian.2'
The theoretical basis of the law handling the Croatian autonomy is that Croatia is 
’’ein besonderes Territorium besitzende politische Nation’", and that the Croatian- 
Slavonic lands ”in ihren inneren Angelegenheiten eine eigene Gesetzgebung und 
Regierung besitzen” (section 59). At the same time Hungary and Croatia” bilden eine 
und dieselbe Staatsgemeinschaft” for lands inside and outside the Monrachy (section 
1). In the following the law sets firth this communion in more detail -  on the levels of 
both legilation and enforcement -  and deals with the topic of autonomy in less detail.
It follows from the state communion that the king of Hungary and Croatia is -  
according to the Sanctio Pragmatica -  once and the same person, who "wird mit einer 
und derselben Krönungshandlung gekrönt.” (section 2) In those matters that had been 
settled to handle in mutual agreement or as common affairs of Austria and Hungary, 
the principle of commonnes must be respected both in legislation and ruling between 
Hungary and Croatia as well (sections 3-4). But there are common affairs even beyond 
this between Hungary and Croatia in legislation and ruling alike. To these belong the 
expenses of the household as a sum to vote (section 6) and all those rights that the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise ensured to the lands of the Hungarian Crown in the 
line of military affairs, i.e. the voting of recrutes and the settling of the defence-system. 
Partition of recrutes between Hungary and Croatia follows the numerical proportion of 
the population of the two countries. The law lays down in a like manner, that ’’die auf
“T o r preliminaries in 1866-68 see lecture of Vasilije Krestic in Holotik op.cit.
’’’Plough the compromise and the subsequent law have Magyar and Croatian as their official language, but 
since they have their German version (see Bernatlik op.cit. 717-733) taken for authentic. I will give the 
quotations in German language.
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Kroatien, Slavonien und Dalmatien entfallenden Rekruten werden in die Regimenter 
dieser Länder eingereiht” (section 7).
In a very general way the law declares finances common. Not only those that are 
common in Austrian-Hungarian relation, i.e. the estimates, the issueing of banknotes, 
etc., but much more than this, such as taking state loans and the whole of the taxation 
system, etc. Execution of these orders is -  the law says — in the hands of the Hungarian 
minister of finances (sections 8-9). The minister of finances exercises his administra- 
tional right throught the Zagreb board of finances directors (section 22) that is, not 
through the provincial government. The Croatian-Hungarian compromise declares 
common all that is in the line of Austro-Hungarian commercial and customs federation 
(section 9). What is more, it declares common industry in general, passport issueing, 
affairs of citizenship and natualization all on the level of legislation, but execution in 
these matters concerns the provincial government (section 10).
Part of the costs of the Austrian-Hungarian common affairs that charge the Hun­
garian Crown, just as the charges of the Croatian-Hungarian common affairs will be 
devided in the proportion of the taxing capacity. They determined it as 93,56 : 6,44 
(section 11).
Legislation right in common affairs will be in the hands of the ’’gemeinsame 
Reichstage” which is to be convoked once each year (section 31). Croatian delegates 
may use their own mother-tongues at the diet (section 59). They ’’üben ihr Recht der 
persönlichen Äusserung und Abstimmung” in those matters that concern the diet as 
common (section 35).
The Croatian diet was allowed to send 29 delegates in the chamber of deputies of 
the common legislation, taking into considertaion the numerical proportion of the 
population. Later on this was increased up to 34 with the reannexation of the border- 
area, and in 1881 it went up to 40. This also meant, that nearly half of the representatives 
of the provincial diet were at the same time members of the Pest diet as well, where 
they could speak up in Croatian, too. This might be more evident knowing that the 
Croatian diet -  according to the 1888 new provincial law -  could have 90 members. 
Up to that time it had 120.2<’ But the Croatian representatives did not make up 10% of 
the chamber of deputies of Budapest parliament, which, at that time had 413 members.
The law prescribed that the Croatian diet may delegate two representatives to the 
Upper House (sections 32- 36). Regardless of this, Croatian secular and ecclesiastical 
dignities would keep their membership in the Upper House (section 37). Participation 
of the Croatian diet was ensured even in the delegations and in such a way, that four 
members out of the Magyar delegation sent by the chamber of deputies must be 
Croatian representatives of the Hungarian diet. One out of the members sent by the 
Upper House must be likewise Croatian (section 41).
As regards objects of the autonomy, the law makes a general statement: ’’Hinsichtlich 
aller jener Gegenstände, welche in diesem Übereinkommen nicht dem gemeinsamen 
Reichstage und der Zentralregierung vorbehatten sind, steht Kroatien, Slawonien und 
Dalmatien sowohl im Bereiche der Gesetzgebung, als der Exekutive die volle 26
26Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 vol.2. Verwaltung und Rechtswesen. Wien. 1975. pp.484-485.
DUALISTIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE HABSBURG 189
Autonomie zu”, (section 47) The law provides definite guidelines in a number of points 
concerning the whole variety of items that belong to this topic: home affairs, religion 
and public education, justice on all levels (section 48). The law lays down that the 
language of legislation, of administration and of jurisdiction is Croatian all over Croatia 
(section 56). It also states that the language of administrational organs and offices 
working in Croatia on common Magyar-Croatian grounds is equally Croatian (section 
57). Croatia communicates in Croatian even with the Buda-Pest common government 
(section 58). Common laws are to be sent in Croatian to the Croatian diet (section 60).
Croatian flag and arms are used inside Croatia with the restriction that the Croatian 
arms must be covered by the Crown of St. Stephen (section 61 ). Included in the law is 
a measure requiring a Croatian flag beside the Hungarian on the Pest House of 
Parliament, whenever a common affair is being discussed (section 63).
Concerning executive power, the law places it -  in Hungarian-Croatian common 
affairs -  in the hands of ’’die in Budapest residierende” central government (section 
43). The central government exercises the executive power through its own organs, but 
in the event that it is unable to do so, the provincial government must intervene (section 
45). The central government endeavours to act in harmony with the Croatian govern­
ment, but it is only responsible to the common diet (section 45). The central government 
will have a Croatian minister without portfolio, who will represent the interests of 
Croatia, have the right to vote and who is going be responsible to the common diet 
(section 44). They will employ Croats in the affiliate offices of the central government 
in Croatia, just as in the Croatian departments of the central ministries (section 46). 
Croatian departments were set up in those ministries, the range of activities of which 
included Croatia as well. Such were the ministries of agriculture, industry and com­
merce, earthwork and transportation, finances and home defence.
As regards executive power in Croatia, the law appoints the viceroy to the head of 
the autonomous government. The viceroy is responsible to the provincial diet (section 
50). The viceroy is nominated by counsel of the president of the central government 
by the ruler himself (section 51). The viceroy is member of the Upper House (section 
53). Organization of the provincial government further than this belongs to the 
provincial diet, to the measures of which the ruler’s consent is necessary (section 54). 
The viceroy’s responsibility to the provincial diet was nothing more than legal for­
mality, though in 1874 a provincial law was issued according to which this respon­
sibility -  in the event of conscious and serious violation of the provincial laws, and if 
two thirds of the provincial diet votes for holding the viceroy responsible -  could be 
carried out.
They included in the law that Dalmatia’s reannexation to Croatia is desired by 
Hungary as well, but ’’über die bedingungen dieser Reinkorporierung ist indessen auch 
Dalmatien zu hören” (section 65).
The agreement about Dalmatia meant the admittance of the Croatian requirements 
by Hungary, but did not go together with an actual change in the position of Dalmatia, 
belonging to Austria. Later -  defining Dalmatia’s position in constitutional law -  they 
used the following formulation: ”An associate land of Hungary from the point of view 
of constitutional law, and a province of the Austrian Empire administrationally.”
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As regards Fiume the law declares Fiume’s status of corpus separatum, and also, 
that its autonomy will later be discussed in detail by delegations of Hungary, Croatia 
and Fiume (section 66). Fiume’s provincial separatedness was a political fact all 
throught the period, but its autonomy was granted by the Hungarian government -  
shutting out Croatia -  by a temporary measure in 1870. According to this, Fiume is 
ruled by a governor, who is under exclusive supervision of the Hungarian government. 
This measure remained valid until the end of the age. Two seats were given to Fiume 
at the Croatian diet, which, however remained unoccupied.
There may be some further elucidation of the term ’’Slavonic”. Originally it came 
to be used in the sense of ’’Slavia” (Slavic country), and denoted the central parts of 
Croatia, that surrounds Zagreb. This means, looking at its origin, it can be seen as a 
synonym of the notion ’’Croatia”. Later, however it came to stand for the three Eastern 
counties (vârmegye) of Croatia, Pozsega, Veroce and Szerém (Slavonic counties).
There was a huge polemic going on among contemporaries about Croatian 
autonomy, just as about the question of Austro-Hungarian compromise. Polemic 
literature of posterity is fairly voluminous. Differences in interpretation come up even 
in today’s historiography. Some reject all appreciation of autonomy, or even emphasize 
its shady aspects.27 *Others say that Croatian autonomy was furthest reaching within the 
Habsburg Empire, and was well formed even in comparison with contemporary 
European instances. This is that the French historian, Victor Tapié refers to in his 
evaluation: ’The kingdom of Croatia was placed in a subordinate but nonetheless 
advantageous position, within Hungary.”21' But the autonomy did still not meet the 
historically developed demands of the Croatian nation. Some of the liberal Magyar 
leaders were not reluctant to enlarge the Croatian autonomy. Béni Källay, then consul- 
general in Belgrad payed a visit to Deâk on October 24th 1872, and made the following 
notes in his diary about their talks: ”Deak would not object a much larger autonomy 
for Croatia.”29 The Croatian demand, however was not for a wider or broader autonomy, 
but for the shaping of a Southern Slav union under Croatian leadership and the creation 
of a legal position of this state unity that should be equivalent to all state unities within 
the Habsburg Monarchy.
The contemporary Croatian leading layer was split in the question whether to 
represent utmost aims and whether to object all forms of Croatian autonomy in the 
Hungarian Empire. Many of them were for a compromise, and strove for further 
development of their autonomy. At the same time the Croatian National Liberal party, 
later called the Rights Party stuck to requiring a legal position equal to other dualistic 
state unities. This basically implied a concept of trialistic solution.
Although -  at least among the Monarchy’s southern Slav population -  the Croats 
had the best position, they were unable to achieve the union of the Monarchy’s southern 
Slav nations. The Rights Party was not the only one to require the union. Even the actual 
annexation of Dalmatia to Croatia remained unachieved.
27Thc standpoint of Ferdo Hauptmann (Sarajevo). Mayer, op.cit. pp.45-46. Vasilije Krestic (Beograd) reflects 
a similar concept. Holotik, op.cit. p.829.
2*Tapié, op.cit. p.307.
29National Archives (Budapest) Béni Kâllay's writings (p.334) Diary vol.31, a note on the 24th October 1872.
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So there was no way to solve the Croatian question, not even through a compromise. 
Even less did the Croatian autonomy mean a general solution to the southern Slav 
problem. Tensions resulting from this became permanent.
T H E  1868 H U N G A R IA N  N A T IO N A L IT IE S  LAW
Croatian-Magyar negotiations were going on simultaneously to the preparations for 
the legal regulations of the Hungarian nationality questions. The chamber of deputies 
delegated a 40 member committe with the task of working on the proposition. In March 
1867 -  about a year after the committee was delegated -  they brought to existence a 
smaller subcommittee, which finished up and introduced the bill in three months under 
the présidence of Pal Nyâri taking into consideration Eötvös’s intentions.
The bill of the subcommittee reflected the concept of the 1849 decree, the one which 
aimed at a compromise.
That it aimed at a compromise was clearly shown by the fact that the subcommittee 
did not only introduce the pain of the bill, but together with it, five earlier nationality 
bills as well, as a supplement.
The subcommittee bil 1 did not mention the ’’Magyar political nation” that had caused 
so much polemic, although ’’the country’s political unity, that is its territorial integrity, 
the uniformity of its legislation and state government” was given great emphasis 
already in the introduction. The nationalities could, however have acknowledged the 
country’s political integrity unless it is onesidedly Magyar.
The bill in question -  we may well call it Eötvös Bill -  promised far reaching rights 
to the nationalities in the fields of community and ecclesiastical administration (chapter 
I), of municipal administration (chapter II), in the topic of associations, schools, etc. 
(chapter IV), and in legislation (chapter V). All these will form a part of the final draft 
of the law, and stand as its positive content.
Chapters III, IV and VII are particularly noteworthy, since important parts of these were 
either left out from the original law or have been modified in theory. So for instance the 
subcommitte bill labels Hungarian ’’the language of administration in state government”, 
and ’’the language of administration and discussion at the diet”, whereas the later law calls 
it ’’state language” or ’’the official language of the state”. The former was acceptable for 
the nationalities, the latter was not. The subcommittee bill considers the equality of rights 
of the nationalities -  with the emphasis of a last sentence -  a salient point among all laws 
of the country, while it is not included in the draft of the latter law. However, the most 
important difference, one of theoretical significance, was that the bill does not mention 
the notion of the ’’one Magyar political nation”, while the later law does:0
As a supplement to the subcommittee bill, 24 nationality representatives (16 
Romanians, 7 Serbs and 1 Ukrainian) compiled and signed a proposition on the lithe 
of February 1867. It deserves special attention, since -  similarly to the subcommittee
3uIts tcxl is given by Kemény, G. Gâbor: Iralok a nemzetiségi kérdés tôrténetéhez, Magyarorszagon a 
dualizmus koraban (Documents to the History of tthe Nationality Problem in Hungary in the Dualistic Bra) 
Vol.l. Budapest, 1952. pp.49-52.
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concept -  it suggested a compromise. Instead of a total territorial authonomy it asked 
for a solution remebling the Swiss cantons. The most important feature of this is a 
’’rounding up’’ of the counties and the voting districts in such a way that in the 
administrational and voting units there should be relative homogeneity.
This proposition by the nationalities’ representatives -  though requiring to all nations 
having a separate country their own official languages -  accepted Magyar as the 
language of legislation and as that of central authorities -  not as that of the state in 
general: ’The language of the countrywide Magyar nation making up the majority of 
the Country is also the language of legislation and of the central authorities” (section 
4). 1 The subcommittee, while considering Magyar as the official language of the state, 
built it in the bill in such a way that it should be acceptable -  if only for a compromise 
-  for the nationalities.
After the subcommittee bill was spread -  with all its supplements -  among the 
members of the chamber of deputies, it released the nationalist counteraction. It became 
more and more apparent, that the majority of the representatives do not find the bill 
satisfactory as they see too much concession in it in favour of the nationalities. Under 
such circumstances the committee kept putting off- for the time being -  the discussion 
over the subcommittee bill. More than a year elapsed until the 40 member committee 
introduced their own bill on October 28th 1868. Theirs differed greatly from that of the 
subcommittee.
The bill of the committee went beyond the limits of a potential compromise. It 
suggests Magyar emphatically as the ’’official language of the state”, which the 
nationalities’ representatives would evidently not have voted. In spite of this it has still 
important positive features: it does not speak about the notion of the Magyar political 
nation.
The chamber of deputies sent the committee’s report to the sections after whose 
discussions the documents reached the central committee of the chamber of deputies. 
The result of the central committee’s discussion was submitted to the chamber of 
deputies on November 12th 1868. The proposal of the central committee was identical 
with that of the 40 member committee delegated to discuss the nationality problem. A 
new moment in it -  not without theoretical significance -  was to emphasize in its 
preface: settling equality of nationality rights "one only has to set up rules concerning 
official use of languages within the country”.31 2
The chamber of deputies put the date for the bill’s discussion on 24th November, 
according to the plans of the central committee. The nationality representatives intro­
duced their common proposal prepared on 11th February 1867. There were now two 
bills before the chamber of deputies. Right at the beginning Dedk spoke out. He 
explained he had objections against the bill of the central committee. Rewording it and 
writing a new preface to it, he introduced his own full text for discussion. In the preface 
of Deâk’s proposal the most important new part was given particular emphasis: ’’All 
citizens of Hungary form... one nation in the political sense, which is the indivisible
31Kemény, op.cit. pp.5- 9.
X~Kemény, op.cit. pp. 107- 111.
DUALISTIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE HABSBURG 193
uniform Hungarian nation.” Deâk also gave a new structure to the centra! committee 
bill. First he specified the language use of the central institutions and from this he went 
on to the municipal authorities, communities, churches and schools. So, considering 
the introductory proposition, he underlined even more the importance of the state 
language."
This is how, in the general debate from the 24th to the 28th of November there were 
three proposals before the chamber of deputies: that of the central committee, that of 
the nationalities and that of Deâk. First they had to decide which proposal to accept as 
the subject of a detailed discussion. In the end nobody voted for the central committee’s 
proposal. There were 24 nationality representatives voting for the nationality proposal, 
the overwhelming majority, however, voted for Deâk’s bill.
The detailed debate over Deâk’s bill started on 29th November, when the 24 
nationality representatives left the council room.
The 1868 Nationalities Law does not then reflect the trend of Magyar liberalism that 
goes furthest in nationality questions, nor the one that is shown by the 1849 nationality 
decree, by Eötvös’s position, but not the most rigid one either, represented most 
eminently by the county landowners of the nationality territories, but the middle course 
preached by Deâk. Similarly to the extremist attitude, however, this trend excluded all 
ways for a constant and lasting compromise, and included such a contradiction that 
proved insolvable in the practice of the nationality policy. This is the point where we 
should mention the fact, that in two years Magyar representatives (Dâniel Irânyi, Emo 
Simonyi, Ödön Kâllay and Jôzsef Madarâsz) cooperating with Serb Mileticz and 
Romanian Hodosiu and Mosonyi elaborated a new proposal that followed Eötvös’ 
concept. In this they expressed, that Magyars, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks, Ruthenes 
and Germans in Hungary are ’’historical nations of equal rights.” The proposal, instead 
of defining Magyar as the ’’language of the state” considers ’’the language of the 
majority of the country’s inhabitants” as the language of legislation and that of the 
central authorities.44 All this shows very well, that a sensible compromise could have 
been the law worded according to Eötvös’ original proposal.
The Nationalities Law was enacted in the Hungarian code as law 1868:XLIV.
Its negative feature -  as we previously said -  is the principle of the one political 
nation propounded in its preface. It closely follows that the law does not contain a 
theoretical declaration of the euqality of rights of nations and nationalities of Hungary. 
It only recognizes the equality of rights of every citizen ’’whichever nationality they 
should belong to.”
The other problematic element is defining Magyar as ’’state language”, or "the 
official language of the state”. We have already seen, that the dominant role of Magyar 
as that of the nationality in majority was recognized by the leaders of the naitonalities. 
That is to say that they did not deny the practicality of an ’’administrational language” 
for which purpose Magyar would be the most suitable, being the language of the
"Kemény, op.cit. pp. 125- 129.
34See text in Mikti. Imre: Nemzetisćgi jog és nemzetiségi politika (Nationality Right and Nationality Policy) 
Kolozsvâr, 1944. pp.250- 251.
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majority of the population. But in declaring Magyar as ’’state language” they saw a 
question of principle, which was the fact that it would raise Magyar above the languages 
of the other nationalities.
A positive feature of the law is that is specifies the ways of using the mother-tongue 
in administration, jurisdiction, ecclesiastical organization and education in a very wide 
range, in sufficient detail and exhaustive thoroughness. The law was unique in Eastern 
and Central Europe in giving such codified liberty in the use of the minority’s 
mother-tongue. It was a rarity in its time in Western Europe as well, but it was the only 
one with that thoroughness in codification.
According to the statement of the law the language of the government and that of 
the diet is -  as a state language requires it -  Magyar, and laws are also laid down in 
Magyar, but at the same time they are published in all nationalities’ language in the 
country in an authoritative translation (section 1). Municipal records are written in the 
official language of the state, but besides this in all other ones, that are claimed for by 
at least 1/5 of the bodies representing the municipal authorities (section 2). Everybody may 
use his or her mother-tongue at municipal gatherings (section 3). In documents addressed 
to the government, municipal authorities use the official language of the state, though they 
may use any of the languages that they use in records (section 4). The law requires that 
municipal clerks should use -  in communication with communities, unions and individuals 
-  the mother-tongues of these to their means (section 6).
As regards jurisdiction, everyone is allowed to use his or her mother tongue in the 
court of the community. In the court of the particular district people use the language 
of the administration or of the record of their own ditricts (section 7).
Concerning activities of churches of official nature (church courts, birth registers, 
etc.) the law follows adopts the principle of giving freedom in that field (sections 10, 
14-16). ’’Similarly -  within the limits of the national education law -  they may freely 
choose the language of education in their schools” (section 14).
Choice of the language of education in educational institutions already set up or to 
be set up in the future by the state is in the hands of the minister of education. At the 
same time ”he must see to it that in state educational institutions all citizens of the 
homeland of any nationality living together in larger grouping should be able to get 
their education in their own mother tongues in the public life of their own districts up 
to the age where a higher academic formation begins” (section 17). In secondary and 
high schools founded by the state, there has to be a language and literature department 
for the particular languages spoken in the given territory (section 18). Magyar is the 
language in which lectures are held at the university, but there have to be departments 
for all languages and literatures spoken in the country (section 19).
The Law permits for communities, churches and individuals to build schools for 
primary, secondary and high education on their own efforts. The language of education 
at these schools is chosen by the founders thereof (section 26).
There are several sections giving instructions about the language use of com­
munities. These sections concern inner affairs and the relation of communities to their 
superior organs, where they get practically total freedom in using their mother tongues 
(sections 20- 24).
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The closing passage is of outstanding importance: nationality is no hinderance in 
fulfilling any office or dignity. "Moreover, the state government will take charge that 
only such persons be employed in national judicial and administrational offices and 
mostly in that of the fôispân, that are familiar with the necessary nationality languages, 
and that are suitable even from all other points of view” (section 27).
The most important question in bringing a judgement over the law is to see whether 
it furthered the formation of a lasting compromise among the nations or whether it 
hampered it. A realistic task of the Law could be laying down the bases of an enduring 
compromise in a multinational country. It only fulfilled this task half way.35 The 
nationalities were dissatisfied with it, because it denied from them the status of a 
political nation, and because it codified a state language. At the same time the law, just 
because of its fairness, helped the development of the nationalities and also their 
national feeling, which, on the other hand found dislike on the side of those who clung 
to the principle of the one political Magyar nation. This, too reflected the inner 
contradiction of the 1868 Law. Those shaping the nationality policy were to decide 
sooner or later whether to execute consistently the liberal orders included in the Law. 
In this case they had to count with the fact, that the execution of the law would help 
the development of the nationalities, therefore sooner or later they would have to give 
up the rigid rejection of considering the nationalities as political nations. The other way 
was to push through the acceptance of the concept of the one Magyar political nation 
and the state language at all prices, in which case they would inevitably forced to cut 
liberalism furthering the development of the nationalities. The nationalities law then 
contained a contradiction that made its very execution impossible.
The question was to foresee which of the two factors would gain the upper hand in 
the practice of the nationality policy. In the end it was the insistance on the principle 
of the ’’one political nation” and the ’’state language” and the cutting of the liberalism 
of the Law all laid down in the 1868 law that got realized in practice.
Many a politician of the Magyar progressive reactionary circles -  even on the 
theoretical basis of the one political nationl and that of state language -  reqired the 
realization of the liberalism of the 1868 Law. The actions taken by Lajos Mocsary in 
order to urge the execution of the law are commonly known.36 Towards the end of the 
age it was especially Oszkar Jâszi who criticized continually the official policy, because 
it denied liberalism of the 1868 law, and wished the execution thereof.
The liberal spirit laid down in the 1868 Nationalities Law, even within these 
restricted limits had in many ways a positive effect on the handling of the nationality 
quesiton. Although -  on the basis of the Nationalities Law -  no constant and enduring 
compromise could come to existence among the nationalities of Hungary, still, from 
time to time it got real ized to acertain extent: in spite of the constant debate and struggle.
,5Sec on this topic the paper of C.A. Macartney in Berger. Peter (cd.): Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich 
von 1867. Vorgeschichte und Wirkunge. Wien-München. 1967. Especially p.228.
"See Gogohik. Lajos Mocstiry Lajos élete és a nemzctiségi kérdés (The Life of Lajos Mocsary and the 
Nationality Problem) Budapest, 1943; Toth. Ede: Mocsary Lajos élete és politikai pâlyakezdctc (Lajos 
Mocsary -  his Life and the Beginning of his Political Carreer) Budapest. 1967.
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a very fragile compromise was more or less at work among the nations of Hungary until 
1914.
The restricted enforcement, more exactly the restricted success of the liberal content 
of the 1868 law was clearly shown by the fact, that the ’’racist” handling of the 
nationality question, i.e. the underrating of particular ethnic grops was far from both 
the official Magyar national thinking of the age of Dualism, both from the Nationalities 
Law. On the contrary, the nation-concept of Hungarian liberalism helped in all possible 
ways the mingling of different ethnic groups. Even the stressing of the Magyar character 
of the one political nation did not go against this.
The nationality policy of Dualism differed in practice from the liberal concept of the 
1868 law, but followed it at the same time in many ways. It did not ensure entirely what 
had been laid down in law about language use and schooling, still it made possible the 
linguistic and cultural development of the non-Magyar nations. This is why the 
half-a-century-long period of dualistic multinational Hungarian history was equally 
important a period in the development of the Slovak, Romanian, Southern Slav and 
German ethnic groups in Hungary, even if the practice of nationality policy did not 
cease to hinder this development.
Hungary in the age of Dualism -  together with its Nationalities Law -  was a factor 
that undeniably hampered the formation of a state structure that answered a multina­
tional population composition. At the same time, however, it was a state structure that 
gave space to the growth of the national identity of the different nations, and whithin 
which the ethnic and cultural interaction of different nations could come to the surface.
Nations within the the multinational state -  Magyars, Roumanians, Germans, 
Slovaks, Southern Slavs -  could not shape out -  on the basis of the 1868 law -  a state 
structure indispensable for a stable synbiosis, but could at the same time grow their 
nationality and hand down mutually lasting values of their cultures as well as of their 
nationalities’ traditions.
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